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One of the great pleasures of my position in a nation-
ally known writing-across-the curriculum program is
discovering in many scientists a deep appreciation for
humanistic thinking. The science wars wage on in the
background, and I do find plenty of evidence of rifts
between the “two cultures” that C. P. Snow described
a half century ago. Nonetheless, there are on our cam-
pus many mathematicians and scientists who not only
harbor all sorts of artistic talents, but also call upon
their students to use language and to think imagina-
tively. Long before Professor Dennis Sentilles’ calcu-
lus course was formally designated “writing inten-
sive,” he had asked his students to write. That is,
Sentilles recognized the power of language to help
students conceptualize the mathematical procedures
they were working through. His most noteworthy
assignment, now a staple in his writing intensive sec-
tions, asks students to compare differential calculus
to a videotaped tennis game. Students use the ex-
tended metaphor (see “A Leitmotif for Differential
Calculus,” facing page) to explain the nature and mea-
surement of time and motion and their representa-
tions from practical, cognitive, scientific, and math-
ematical points of view.
Intrigued by this professor’s assignment, I wanted to
review other scientists’ use of analogic thinking and
to investigate, however informally, some students’
responses to analogic thinking. Following is a brief
tour through the history of analogic thinking in sci-
ence as well as a discussion of analogic thinking as
reported by six students, three from Sentilles’ calcu-
lus classes and three from a writing-intensive genet-
ics class that also foregrounds language and imagina-
tive thinking.
SCIENTISTS AND LANGUAGE
Scientists have typically defined scientific writing in
terms of the other: It is not literary. It is not ambigu-
ous, expressive, personal, or persuasive. It certainly
does not favor metaphor. This prejudice against “lit-
erary language” was strong in 1660, when members
of the first British society of scientists denounced “all
amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style”
and called for a return to a “primitive purity” of lan-
guage. Instead of the “superfluity of talking” that has
“overwhelm’d most other Arts and Professions,” the
new sciences demanded a “naked, natural way of
speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a native
easiness” (as quoted by Locke 4 and
Bizzell 642).
Three hundred years after the founding of the British
Royal Society, many scientific style manuals still pan
any use of metaphor or figurative language. Sentilles’
use of an extended analogy in calculus might be sus-
pect except for its heuristic or pedagogical value.
Analogies might be useful for communicating some-
thing to a broad or popular audience, but many sci-
entists would still argue that analogies have little place
in discovery or in communicating to a specialized
audience. A look at the history of science suggests oth-
erwise, though: analogic thinking has been important
both in the discovery and the communication of
knowledge, as well as in the more obvious role of
teaching. An informal protocol/interview analysis of
six students suggests that analogic thinking may be
valuable, not so much because it bridges old and new
concepts and expedites learning, but because in many
cases it disrupts and slows down learning.
ANALOGIC THINKING IN SCIENCE
Investigations into the role of analogy in science have
not been limited to pedagogy. Philosophers and his-
torians of science have also studied the role of anal-
ogy at the points both of scientific discovery and sci-
entific argument or justification. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, physicist and mathematician Henri Poincaré as-
Analogic Thinking in Science and Math
Martha D. Patton
Campus Writing Program
325 General Classroom Building
University of Missouri-Columbia
Columbia, Missouri 65211
writmdp@showme.missouri.edu
(573) 884-6221
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #20 39
Geometry of Graph
Graph of f
One point on the
graph: (t, f(t))
Horizontal axis
Vertical axis
Vertical increment in
graph
Horizontal shift or
increment
Slope of secant (two-
point) line to the
graph between (t, f(t))
and (t+h, f(t+h))
Slope of tangent line
at the point (t, f(t))
All tangents to the
graph of f
Math Model
The function f
f(t)
Domain of f
Range of f
Difference in function
values: f(t+h)-f(t)
Difference in underly-
ing variable: (t+h)-t=h
Average rate of
change:
  
f t h f t
h
( ) ( )+ −
f’(t)=
  
lim
0
( ) ( )
h
f t h f t
h→
+ −
The derivative of f: f’
as a new function
Videotape
The whole videotape
Image on frame
taken at time t
Length of time spent
taping (# frames)
All frames on the
videotape
Change between
images
Time between frames
Sense of change
between images
Video motion seen at
time t
Viewing the video
External Reality
The path of the ball
Where the ball is at
time t
How long the ball is
in flight
All the different
positions of the ball
How much the ball
rises between two
moments
How much time
changes
How quickly the ball
appears to rise
between two sepa-
rated moments
How fast the ball is
rising at time t
The flight of the ball
Cognition
The time-ball “sys-
tem”
State at time t
Duration of events
All individual states
of the system
Change-of-state
Time span
Average rate of
change (rise): one’s
sense of motion over
a span of time
Rate, or change-of-
state, at the moment
t
The motion, or flow,
of the system
A Leitmotif for Differential Calculus
Imagine being out on the tennis court with the ball rising toward you. Differential calculus is the mathematics that
describes and measures change in such an ever changing “time-ball” system. One can use this easily imagined setting
to elucidate a leitmotif for differential calculus along the following conceptual theme line, where f(t) is the height of the
tennis ball at time t:
Computation < ——-— Abstraction < ———— Life/Reality —-— > Cognition
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serted that “logic, which alone can give certainty, is
the instrument of demonstration; intuition is the in-
strument of invention,” and he credited analogy with
being the guide to mathematical invention. The Ital-
ian rhetorician Giambattista Vico made similar claims
two hundred years earlier. Many scientists, including
Humphry Davy, Robert Hooke, Johannes Kepler,
Antoine Lavoisier, and Robert Oppenheimer, have
also acknowledged the role of analogy in discovery
or in intuition (Leatherdale). Perhaps the most famous
scientific analogy is Friedrich August Kekule’s account
of dreaming about a serpent biting its own tail just
prior to his discovering the structure of the benzene
ring:
During my stay in Ghent, Belgium, I lived in a
fine room on the main street. I sat in this room
and wrote on my textbook, but could make
no progress—my mind was on other things. I
turned my chair to the fire and sank into a
doze. Again the atoms were gamboling before
my eyes. Little groups kept modestly in the
background. My mind’s eye, trained by the
observation of similar forms, could now dis-
tinguish more complex structures of various
kinds. Long chains here and there were firmly
joined; all winding and turning with snake-
like motion. Suddenly, one of the serpents
caught its own tail and the ring thus formed
whirled exasperatingly before my eyes. I woke
as by lightning and spent the rest of the night
working out the logical consequences of my
hypothesis (qtd. by Leatherdale 20).
Astonishing as some accounts of analogic thinking are
for scientific discovery, they are less controversial than
the accounts of analogy in scientific argument, par-
ticularly in scientific induction. While Aristotle cau-
tioned against argument by analogy (as many logi-
cians have since), Francis Bacon recognized the im-
portance of analogy to scientific argument. John
Maynard Keynes further credits Bacon with distin-
guishing between positive and false analogies. Twen-
tieth-century philosopher of science Mary Hesse
modifies Bacon’s distinction between positive and
false analogies by examining the positive and false
elements within any given analogy. Within any one
analogy are both positive and negative components.
The predictive power of analogic thinking comes, ac-
cording to Hesse, from a third element, the part of the
analogy about which scientists are still undecided.
This distinction is similar to one made by Mike in the
discussion below: students might be irritated by the
false elements of an analogy, but constructively
troubled by a “third element,” the part that slows them
down and causes them to mull over the concept. Few
scientists or philosophers of science deny that analo-
gies offer a heuristic value—in the classroom or in the
profession, but there is less consensus about the ne-
cessity of analogy for scientific explanations. Hesse,
among others, argues that analogy is necessary for
scientific argument.
Philosophers have asked parallel questions about the
role of analogy in language. Friedrich Nietzsche’s radi-
cal assertion that all language is metaphoric (and,
therefore, analogic) has become commonplace in the
twentieth century. Postmodernists have largely dis-
missed the cautionary hedge in I. A. Richards’ com-
ment, “Even in the rigid language of the settled sci-
ences we do not eliminate or prevent [metaphor] with-
out great difficulty” (92). I contend that we in the late
1990s need to revisit Richards who, on one hand, de-
nounced “the one and only one meaning superstition”
and boldly asserted that “metaphor is the omnipres-
ent principle of language” and, on the other hand,
recognized greater rigidity and stability in the lan-
guage of science.
To the degree that philosophers and scientists agree
that metaphor and analogy play a vital role in science,
they aren’t entirely celebratory. Turbayne cautions that
victims of metaphor are trapped unwittingly by pre-
vailing metaphors, much as Thomas Kuhn argues that
the prevailing metaphors in a given paradigm both
shape and limit scientists’ thinking.
However, the “problem” areas of analogies might be
prime sites for “disequilibrium,” Jean Piaget’s term
for the tension between the known and unknown that
motivates leaming—in this case, learning about sci-
ence and learning about language. This is the concept
that Robert Mayer builds upon in “The Instructive
Metaphor: Metaphoric Aids to Students’ Understand-
ing of Science” (1993).
ANALOGIC THINKING IN NOVICE SCIENTISTS
Mayer is not the first to think about the role of a par-
ticular kind of analogy, metaphor, in learning. The
1970’s marked the “cognitive turn” in psychology and
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #20 41
in “metaphorology,” a time in which psychologists,
cognitive linguists, anthropologists, and literary theo-
rists widely accepted the premise that metaphor is not
just a marker of deviance (genius), as Aristotle be-
lieved, but is common (by degree) to all thought. Cog-
nitive linguists explored not only linguistic structures
in a text, but also the ways in which a reader processed
them. In the following quarter of a century,
sociolinguists have called attention to the importance
of context and social relations in discourse.
In a 1994 study of student processing of metaphor,
Understanding Metaphor in Literature, Gerard Steen
analyzes the ways in which students of literature pro-
cess both potential metaphors (linguistic structures
identified by experts as metaphor) and realized meta-
phors (cognitive reconstructions of potential meta-
phors). As a discourse analyst working in the realm
of pragmatics, Steen assumes that the reader, the text,
and the context are all constituents in the study, but
that the reader is at the center of the investigation. He
assumes that a reader’s goals are partly socially de-
termined and that discourse communities share cer-
tain regularities and conventions. In this study Steen
attempts to move reception theory from the text to
the reader as a locus of discourse analysis. Steen first
asked students to underline metaphors in a text to see
if students recognized as potential metaphors the same
linguistic structures as those identified by expert read-
ers, in this case a panel of literature professors.
Sharing scholarly debts to pragmatics and discourse
analysis, I wish to explore the relevance of Steen’s in-
quiry to science literacy studies. I broadened and al-
tered the scope from a study of literature students’
processing of metaphor to a study of science students’
processing of analogy. Over a dozen students partici-
pated in this study, but I focused on six, three from
the calculus course described above and three from a
writing-intensive genetics course. Slightly modifying
Steen’s methodology, I asked students first to under-
line analogies in each of three texts and explain them
in a taped interview afterwards, and secondly to
“think aloud” as they orally read three different pas-
sages. In each of the two sessions, the underlining/
explanation session and the think-aloud/explanation
session, students responded to an excerpt from a work
of popular science written for a general audience, an
excerpt from a science text (Human Genetics) written
for college students, and an excerpt from a science
journal written for experts in neurophysiology. My
initial question, to what degree do student readers of
science think analogically, developed into the follow-
ing six questions as the interviews took place:
• Do these six students recognize as potential analo-
gies the same linguistic structures identified by
experts?
• Do these six students process potential analogies
analogically? (That is, are potential analogies read
literally or figuratively, and, if figuratively, in what
ways?)
• Do these six students find analogies helpful in un-
derstanding the content?
• What happens when an analogy breaks down, as
most analogies eventually do?
• To the degree some analogies bridge new and old
information, how does the bridging work?
• Does analogic thinking lead to greater insight into
the nature of language?
In general, there was a wide discrepancy between
potential and realized analogies. Most of the students
only realized or reconstructed the potential analogies
when they talked or wrote about them. These students
found some analogies much more helpful than others,
but all of the students interviewed affirmed the po-
tential instructional value of using analogic thinking
in the sciences and of having qualitative learning pre-
cede quantitative learning. And, for most students,
the interview project led them to think about the lan-
guage of science in ways that had never before oc-
curred to them. The not-so-literal dimension of lan-
guage is more pervasive than most students had real-
ized. This awareness, in turn, did lead a few students
to think about the ways in which science is “made” in
new ways, but it did not cause them to question the
value of science. These conclusions, along with the
success of the written assignments foregrounding
analogy in the calculus course, point to the value of
making deliberate use of carefully selected analogies
in the sciences.
POTENTIAL ANALOGIES
With one exception, students preferred the popular
science genre to either the text excerpts or to the tech-
nical academic articles, and they attributed their pref-
erence to the abundant images and comparisons in
the popular science writing. Students made comments
such as “It got you interested” and “That was help-
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ful; I probably wouldn’t’ve understood it [the article]
without them [the analogies]” — or “It gave me some-
thing concrete to hold in my mind.” In the first popu-
lar science excerpt, entropy was compared both to an
engine running out of gas (a conventional analogy
used in most physics courses) and to a casino closing
down (a novel and productive analogy for all six read-
ers). Even when students claimed to enjoy excerpts
with many “potential analogies,” though, they didn’t
always identify the analogies as such. Five of the stu-
dents rarely identified as analogies anything other
than similes or phrases that were announced by tags
such as “...is like.” None of the students, for example,
identified “cDNA library,” “transcription,” “editing,”
or “palindrome” as part of an extended linguistic anal-
ogy, even though they could readily identify more
terms in the same group once the extended analogy
had been pointed out to
them. The distinction made
here between “potential”
and “constructed” analo-
gies is affirmed by the stu-
dents’ “monovalent” read-
ing of many conventional
analogies (by a literal read-
ing of a conventional anal-
ogy). With the exception of
the same student (Steve), the undergraduates disliked
the technical article, which made little blatant use of
analogy.
Steve, the most advanced of the calculus students,
expressed decided appreciation of analogies, but con-
structed his own analogies with or without the prompt
of the “potential analogy.” As he put it, “I’d almost
say that any time I see something that I’m familiar
with, the whole index [of mind and memory] is
opened up, and I can pull out my file card and say,
ah, here’s one!” The lack of “potential analogies” in
the technical article did not bother him because he
was rifling his own mental files, including many “re-
ceived” analogies from other texts and lectures. He
liked the technical article precisely because it was the
most foreign to him, because it challenged him the
most to construct his own analogies or to recall analo-
gies from memory. In the genetics text excerpts, also,
one phrase after another would elicit an analogy not
present in the text structure but present in Steve’s
memory from a drawing on the blackboard in a pre-
vious course or from a picture in an old textbook.
CONSTRUCTED ANALOGIES
Although Steve was the most active reader—the most
ranging in his connections beyond those presented in
the text—all six students constructed analogies when
given an opportunity to write or talk about them.
Some analogies were grounded in “potential analo-
gies,” those text structures that expert readers would
identify as analogies; other analogies were compari-
sons between seemingly-literal information in the text
and something in the students’ experience. For ex-
ample, few students read “blind watchmaker” as
much other than a placeholder for an unfamiliar idea
in the think-aloud interviews, but the more they
talked, the more they began to make sense of “blind”
and to sort through similarities and differences in the
sonar capacity of bats (a result of chance and evolu-
tion) and the sonar capacity of machines (purpose-
fully designed by engi-
neers).
The three calculus students
had also just completed the
course in which they were
asked to explain in writing
an extended analogy of a
videotape of a tennis game.
As indicated earlier, the
professor of this course, Dennis Sentilles, compares
calculus to an ever-changing “time-ball system.” A
function is compared to the whole videotape of the
path of a tennis ball, and the domain of f is compared
to the length of time the ball is in flight (the number
of frames on the videotape) and the range of f is com-
pared to all the different positions of the ball (or all
the frames on the videotape). All three students found
this approach to calculus revolutionary and construc-
tive. Steve, who claimed to have an intuitive under-
standing of the equations, found himself re-defining
and clarifying ideas that had already made some sense
to him. He found the videotape analogy indispens-
able and, when asked if he would teach in the man-
ner of Sentilles, responded, “most definitely...I think
if you force people to make analogies or have an anal-
ogy set up for them, the fundamental parts of calcu-
lus won’t be glossed over so much, but will be used
and understood.” That, unfortunately, is what Tom
described as being the case in previous courses: “Be-
fore I went in there, I just got pushed through calcu-
lus, and I didn’t really learn to conceptualize it.”
Learning to think qualitatively and not just quantita-
❝...if you force people to make analogies or have
an analogy set up for them, the fundamental parts
of calculus won’t be glossed over so much, but
will be used and understood.     --Steve
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tively proved to be revolutionary for him in other
courses as well. “After this course, after I started in
this course, my grades shot up because I would sit
back and look at something and say, ‘Okay, I can’t get
this, why? What are we doing?’ And after a while, I’d
say, ‘ah, that’s why!’” Mike, the third calculus student,
also said that “for me, it was the analogies that made
my understanding. I couldn’t just throw those out.”
All three of them, though, identified the writing pro-
cess as the place where the received analogy started
to make full sense, where the “potential analogy” cre-
ated by Sentilles became a “constructed” or “recon-
structed” analogy in their own minds. Two tentative
conclusions might be drawn from this: first, potential
analogies might not offer much if students aren’t asked
to play with them, if students aren’t given the time
and resources to reconstruct them. Second, all analo-
gies are not equally valuable: Sentilles had experi-
mented with many other potential analogies before
settling on the time-ball analogy that proved to be
powerful for a wide variety of math students.
ANALOGIC BREAKDOWN
Steve identified “negative analogy” or inaccurate com-
parisons in both the genetic text and popular science
excerpts. He conceded that these limitations could
lead to misunderstanding. Instead of ending the anal-
ogy, though, he felt readers should keep extending
the analogy: “Keep re-defining, keep talking.” Here, I
would like to distinguish between those analogies that
fail because the student already possesses a more re-
fined understanding of the concept and those analo-
gies that are troubling, provocative. Most students
who found some analogies too simplistic simply
skipped over them. In the Human Genetics text, nu-
merous similes were used, and some simply failed for
students who had considerable coursework in biol-
ogy. For example, most students found useful a com-
parison of Vitamin D and a faulty receptor to a ferry
unable to dock, but advanced biology students found
other similes limited. However, if an analogy was trou-
bling (not simplistic, but troubling), most students
found even the troubling part stimulating. Mike and
Steve both objected to some of the emotional implica-
tions of the casino analogy for entropy; neither wanted
to view entropy as something “bad” or something to
lament. Mike didn’t fault the writer, though, for an
imperfect analogy is thought-provoking, slows a
reader down: “Because if he didn’t have words in here
like that you’d just read it and go on...but then he used
words that have a lot of different meanings, or could
have...and you have to think...and it makes you mull
it over.” In other words, the “meaningful calculus”
sought by professors such as Sentilles or the “instruc-
tive metaphor” sought by learning theorists such as
Richard Mayer comes about by gaps that motivate
new learning.
BRIDGING OLD AND NEW INFORMATION
All six students were quick to credit analogies with
getting them interested in new material. Only one of
them expressed much interest in entropy, but all of
them found the article about entropy quite interest-
ing. It appears, though, that analogies function even
more effectively by breaking up a bridge, by creating
a hurdle, or slowing down a train of thought. In both
cases, the analogy often functioned as a placeholder,
a space for a concept that would become better un-
derstood in time. Several of Mike’s comments pointed
to still another function of analogy: a bridge not from
the unfamiliar to the familiar, but from the now-thor-
oughly-understood to memory. In other words, analo-
gies can function as a way of compressing and repack-
aging already-understood concepts for long-term stor-
age.
INSIGHT INTO LANGUAGE
The more I gave these six students an opportunity to
explain themselves, the more they realized that they
were dependent by degree on analogies. Put another
way, the more they tried to remove themselves from
analogic thinking, the more they realized they couldn’t
do it. They began to realize that words and concepts
are born and grow and change, and most found it
impossible to express scientific concepts in absolutely
value-free language. Many had never before thought
about the etymology of conventional vocabulary such
as “bacteria” (little staffs). Several returned to the sec-
ond interview with examples of analogies they had
found in other science texts. Although students gained
insight into language, their insight was a byproduct
of their learning about something—entropy or natu-
ral selection or transcription or neural transplants.
They weren’t bashing science, but were gaining in-
sight into it.
CONCLUSION
Writing across the curriculum (WAC) programs, such
as the one in which I work, have largely substituted a
belief in linguistic positivism (which treats language
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as if it were a transparent medium and writing skills
as if they were generalizable across all contexts) with
a belief that language can never be completely “clear,”
can never be completely rid of analogy, and, even if it
could, it shouldn’t. As scientists and humanists work
together to better understand the languages and con-
ventions that do characterize our disciplines, we may
also better understand each other.
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